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ABSTRACT 
The demolition of highly contaminated plutonium 
buildings usually is a long and expensive process that involves 
decontaminating the building to near free- release standards and 
then using conventional methods to remove the structure. It 
doesn’t, however, have to be that way. Fluor has torn down 
buildings highly contaminated with plutonhn without 
excessive decontamination. By removing the select source 
term and fixing the remaining contamination on the walls, 
ceilings, floors, and equipment surfaces; open-air demolition is 
not only feasible, but it can be done cheaper, better (safer), and 
faster. 
Open-air demolition techniques were used to demolish two 
highly contaminated buildings to slab-on-grade. These facilities 
on the Department of Energy’s Hanford Site were located in, or 
very near, compounds of operating nuclear facilities that 
housed hundreds of people working on a daily basis. To keep 
the facilities operating and the personnel safe, the projects had 
to be creative in demolishing the structures. Several key 
techniques were used to control contamination and keep it 
within the confines of the demolition area: spraying fixatives 
before demolition; applying fixative and misting with a fine 
spray of water as the buildings were being taken down; and 
demolishing the buildings in a controlled and methodical 
manner. In addition, detailed air-dispersion modeling was done 
to establish necessary building and meteoxologicaI conditions 
and to c o n f i  the adequacy of the proposed methods. 
Both demolition projects were accomplished without any 
spread of contamination outside the modest buffer areas 
established for contamination control. Furthermore, personnel 
exposure to radiological and physical hazards was significantly 
reduced by using heavy equipment rather than “hauds on” 
techniques. 
1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last three years, Fluor has demolished two 
buildings that were highly contaminated with plutonium at the 
Hanford Site in southeastern Washington state . Both buildings 
had substantial alpha contamination (readings to 1 billion 
dpm/lOOcmZ) left in them when conventional demolition began. 
Both buildings were situated in operating plants or near other 
operational facilities where hundreds of personnel worked 
within a few hundred meters. 
Basing decontamination end points on technical 
requirements such as waste acceptance criteria and dispersion 
modeling rather than on emotional (that’s the way it has dways 
been done, or fear of the unknown) provided defined and 
defensible results. 
Because conventional methods and equipment were 
blended with innovative techniques and strategies, these 
buildings were safely and compliantly demolished and disposed 
of. Gone are the days of cleaning buildings to near “free 
release” conditions before demolitton. Applying As Low as 
Reasonably Acceptable, (ALARA) principles, these projects 
chose tactical decontamination and heavy equipment versus a 
global hand decontamkation approach as the path forward. 
Not only is it ALARA, but it is also safer, more cost effective, 
and faster. 
Because of the significant hazard to the environment, 
decisions (under processes of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 [CERCLA])were made by the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and 
the Washington Department of Ecology, (Ecology) to 
remove/demolish these facilities [l]. 
As part of the CERCLA decision process, separate 
engineering evaluatiodcost analysis documents for removing 
the buildings were completed and the alternative of demolition 
to slab-on-grade was selected. The building slabs will be 
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Figure 1. The 232-2 Facility and nearby buildings before 
demolition. 
Facility Descriptions 
The buildings were constructed in the mid to late 1950s 
and operated their respective processes for about 12 years. At 
233-S, the process was to concentrate and package plutonium 
nitrate, and at 232-2, the process was to recover plutonium by 
incinerating plutonium-contaminated combustible waste. 
With most operations of this type, there were process 
upsets that contaminated the buildings with significant amounts 
of alpha contamination. Readings in excess of 7.00E6 
disintegrations per minute were recorded in these facilities 
before demolition [2]. 
In the 1990s, it was determined that these facilities posed a 
significant hazard to the environment and efforts began to 
mitigate the hazard by decontaminatingldecommissioning the 
buildings. During the deactivation phase, a considerable 
amount of equipment and waste was removed. In total, 
thousands of grams of plutonium were removed from the 
facilities in the form of contamination and material held-up in 
glove boxes, ventilation ducting, miscellaneous equipment, 
piping, and debris. 
The two buildings combined represented less than 550 
square meters (5,970 square feet) of total floor space. The 
biggest difference in construction was that 233-S had a 9.7 m 
(32 ft.) high concrete process cell. Otherwise, the buildings 
Maturity of the team (and surrounding personnel) 
preparing for demolition 
o Is the team experienced? 
o Are there personnel in the vicinity and what 
is their comfort level or knowledge with 
demolition? 
Is this selective demolition (picking out a 
building among others)? 
Or is the building(s) in an area of broad scale 
demolition? 
Contamination control 
Type, location, and concentration of 
contamination 
What needs to be done before starting 
demolition to control contamination? 
What needs to be done during demolition? 
Slab on grade or complete removal 
How will the area be used when demolition is 
complete? 
Operatingkontrol boundaries 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
What is the end state? 
Team Maturity and Maturity of Any Surrounding 
Personnel 
Is the Team Experienced? 
An experienced team provides a much higher level of 
confidence than one that is just learning how to tackle 
demolishing a contaminated facility. An experienced 
2 Copyright 0 2007 by ASME 
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demolition team must have experience in dealing with 
radiological contamination to fully appreciate the magnitude 
and other idiosyncrasies of these types of projects. On our first 
demolition effort, some personnel on the team were extremely 
skeptical that the demolition could be performed safely. By the 
end though, these people also became some of our biggest 
supporters. . 
An experienced contaminated demolition team helps 
alleviate fears of other personnel not associated with the 
project. The best option is to have no other personnel in the 
area, and the farther away the better. As our team's experience 
expanded, so was the confidence level of personnel not directly 
associated with the demolition. 
These buildings were located in or near Hazard Category 2 
nuclear facilities with operating facilities located within a few 
feet of the building being demolished. By holding 
informational meetmgs with non-project personnel working 
near the work area prior to the demolition, personnel were 
educated and questions answered. This open approach led to a 
smoother demolition effort as questions were answered before 
demolition began, rather than having to stop work to answer 
questions. 
Establishing Operating and Control Boundaries 
Establishing where your radiological control boundaries 
are placed will have a major impact on how much radiological 
contamination can remain in the building for the heavy 
demolition equipment. Using a graded approach and modeling 
tools will provide a defined process and defendable boundaries. 
Hold Up Removal and Radiological Characterization 
The goal is to balance the safety of deactivation efforts to 
remove plutonium Contamination with the safety of 
demolishing the building with some plutonium contamination 
remaining. Using workers to manually remove all (or almost 
all) of the plutonium held up in various systems and building 
components is very labor intensive, costly and time consuming. 
Determining what the demolition effort could safely 
accommodate and what the deactivation effort needed to 
remove became an ALARA (As Low As Reasonably 
Achievable) balancing act between using manual labor, with a 
higher risk to individual health and safety, to remove 
contamination and using a machine with a higher risk of 
contamination spread outside the building footprint. By 
thoughtfully selecting which deactivation activities removed 
the largest concentrations of plutonium-contaminated 
equipment and fixing the rest for demolition with the heavy 
equipment, in the long run saved considerable time and money, 
and significantly reduced the hazards to the workers. 
Atmospheric Dispersion Modeling 
Extensive atmospheric-dispersion modeling was conducted 
using ISC3-PRIME (an EPA-developed program). The ISC- 
PRICE was selected because it calculates dispersion patterns 
considering building wake effects and other meteorological 
phenomena specific to the site being modeled. The objective of 
the modeling was to define the potential levels of airborne and 
soil exposures at surrounding control boundaries. Potential 
hourly emissions rate of plutonium were estimated for the days 
with planned demolition and loading activities. An air- 
3 
dispersion model was used to compute air and surface 
concentration boundaries for each day of operations, 
accounting for local building wake effects, atmospheric 
dispersion climatology, and particle size distribution. The 
modeling used hourly meteorological data collected over ten 
years to examine the effects of wind speed, direction, and 
stability on projected concentrations of contaminants in the air 
and deposited on nearby surfaces. Using the long-term, worst- 
case weather averages for the time fcame of the demolition 
provided concise, defendable, and conservative dispersion 
pattern and peak air exposure limits. 
The different phases of demolition were modeled including 
demolition of each building segment and the loading of debris 
into roll-off cans [3]. 
The modeling results indicated that downwind deposition 
is the main limitation for demolition of a highly alpha- 
contaminated building [4]. The main downwind deposition 
contribution came from debris load out into the roll off cans. 
With this information, the projects positioned control 
boundaries for the demolition that provided safe operating 
distances for the project workers and other operational (non 
project) personnel in the surrounding area. 
The demolition boundaries were established using the 
dispersion modeling and natural barriers (i.e., buildings, roads). 
The contamination levels inside the building foot print and 
within a few feet of the building dictated that this area would be 
considered a high-contamination Area (HCA). A 
contamination area (CA), surrounding the HCA, was 
established that allowed sufficient room for positioning the roll- 
off cans and moving equipment. A radiological buffer area was 
positioned around the CA to allow for some equipment and 
additional contingency space, and finally a demolition 
boundary for industrial safety and control of the area. 
Based on actual survey results of the area and some post 
air-dispersion modeling it was determined that initial modeling 
results were overly conservative. Using more realistic input 
factors for estimating the potential emission rates is necessary 
to make the predicted exposures be more consistent with the 
monitoring data. Accounting for higher moisture in the rubble 
being loaded is an example of such an action [5].  
Characterization 
In compliance with the approved sampling analysis plans, 
to c o d m  the basis in the dispersion modeling, and for waste 
determination, extensive radiological surveys and 
nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements were performed 
during the deactivation phase. Between .5 and .9 grams of 
Transuranic (TRU) material remained in each of the buildings 
when the heavy equipment began demolition. At 233-S, an 
additional 12 grams remained in the three-story concrete room 
before it was demolished using concrete saws. 
The isotopes of concern were predominately Pu-239 (85%- 
go%), with much smaller weight fractions of Pu-240 (8%- 
lo%), Pu-241(0.2%4.7%), and AM-241 (-1%) [l, 21. 
Protecting Adjacent Facilities 
When performing demolition activities near operating 
facilities, protecting adjacent facilities and infrastsucture will be 
required. Whether for controlling contamination control or 
preventing physical damage, careful planning and 
considerations is a must. 
Copyright 8 2007 by ASME 
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Protection of adjacent buildings, underground pipe chases, 
exposed piping, conduits, walkways, and underground piping 
needs to be carefilly planned to avoid serious cost and schedule 
@acts to a project. 
In one instance, the building was sandwiched on three 
sides. With the closest adjacent building interface just 10 cm (4 
in.) and the others at 5 m (15 ft.) and 7 m (22 ft.) respectively, 
precision demolition and tight radiological controls were 
required. The closest building had 24-7 operations with no 
intention of shutting down and was a Category 2 Nuclear 
Facility. To protect the critical components of the building, 
sheet metal was used to cover piping, conduit, and the walk- 
way to eliminate potential damage due to falling debris and to 
minimize the potential for contaminating these components. 
Sheet metal (rather than plywood) had to be used because of 
frre loading concerns. 
Operations in the other two buildings were discontinued 
during demolition; however, when the project was completed, 
these buildings were to be returned to fully functional service. 
Plastic sheeting was draped on the buildings and held in place 
with industrial-type magnets. Although effective in keeping the 
buildings radiologically “clean,” the plastic was difficult to 
place and occasional periods of high winds required 
maintenance of the plastic sheeting during the project. 
Underground pipe chases were protected by construction 
of plywood tents to prevent debris fiom falling on the pipe 
chase lid and instituting working limit boundaries. Highly 
contaminated underground duct work was filled with flowable 
gout to prevent potential water intrusion and collapse. 
Contamination Control 
Pre-Demolition Fixing of Contamination 
With contamination readings of up to 1 million 
dpndlOOcm2 on the walls and floors and readings over a 100 
million dpdlOOcml in specific areas, significant care had to be 
taken to immobilize the contamination. A variety of fixatives 
were applied to the interiors of the buildings over their life 
cycles. At the conclusion of deactivation a final fixative 
coating of Polymeric Bamer System TM (PBS) was applied to 
the interior surfaces of the building. This proactive measure 
proved effective at preventing the spread of contamination 
during demolition. 
Another precautionary measure implemented was 
placement of approximately 0.15m (6 in.) of sand on the floors. 
The sand placement served two purposes: to help soften the 
impact of contaminated debris bitting the floor and to capture 
excess contamination and water used to control dust. In 
addition, as a bonus, the sand provided a “filter type” media to 
trap contamination. 
Suppressing Potential Contamination Spread 
The application of a water spray mist to control the dust 
has worked extremely well to control the spread of 
contamination. The mechanisms the projects have employed 
include large fog cannom that emit a heavy mist out to 150 ft, 
misting lines on and around buildings, and misting systems at 
the end effectors on the demolition excavators. 
Water control decisions are determined by the proximity of 
the other buildings, amount of soil or the lack of soil around the 
building, and drainage concerns. Too little water would make 
it difficult to control the dust, and therefore, increase the 
potential spread of contamination. Too much water and the 
project could spend additional resources and time collecting 
and processing the excess water. To balance this situation, 
misting the demolition area along with minimal use of the fire 
hose approach was deployed to engulf the demolition areas in a 
cloud of mist. Figures 3 and 4 show the types of misting 
systems that have been employed for controlling 
contamination. 
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Figure 3. Misting equipment was installed on 232-2, the 
surrounding buildings, and the demolition 
Figure 4. Misting equipment was used during the 2 3 3 4  
demolition project. 
The misting worked very well at keeping the area moist 
and dust and contamination within the CA. However, when 
wind speeds exceeded 13 k m h  (8 mph), the effectiveness of 
4 Copyright 0 2007 by ASME 
Page 13 of 14 of DA05075986 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
i 
I 
i 
, 
I 
i 
! 
I 
i 
misting was greatly diminished; however, because of the other 
controls implemented during demolition, activities were 
allowed to proceed until winds speeds exceeded 20 !un/hr (12 
mph). 
Dust suppression using f r e  hoses also complimented the 
misting efforts for ”point specific” locations. For this project, it 
was critical not to “over do” use of the f i e  hoses, as excess 
water had to be collected and disposed of. The combination of 
the misters and the fue hose worked well in keeping 
contamination within the immediate demolition area. 
Weather conditions were continually monitored via a 
nearby weather station and wind socks to ensure the demolition 
was conducted within the guidelines established to control the 
spread of contamination. The maximum wind speed allowed 
per our procedures during demolition and waste load out 
operations was 2Okm/hr (12 mph}. 
Worker Protection 
Work activities in the CA required personal protective 
equipment (PPE) that included a single set of coveralls, 
waterproof rain gear, and a power air-purifying respirator 
(PAPR) with hood. A lapel air sampler was required for 
personnel monitoring. 
In addition, weather conditions were also monitored for the 
Wet Bulb Globe Temperature, as heat became a huge factor in 
limiting work efforts due to high ambient temperatures. The 
project adjusted the work shift from fnst shift to a graveyard 
shift to mitigate the effects of extreme day time temperatures 
(in excess of 100 OF). 
Demoiition Equipment 
The demolition equipment used on these projects was 
similar (see Fig 3 & 4). A tracked excavator with shear was the 
tool of choice fox “rubblizing” the buildings and some debris 
load out. A rubber fired front end loader was used to pick up 
and load the majority of the debris. 
At the 2334 facility, concrete saws were used to segment 
the 30 cm (12 inch) walls of the process cell into manageable 
slabs. These slabs were lifted off the building with a crane. 
The slabs that met the waste acceptance criteria for low level 
waste were wrapped and placed on ‘<roll off’ flat beds and 
hauled to the waste disposal facility. The slabs that were 
designated as TRU waste were placed in TRU wasted 
containers. 
As anticipated during the planning, equipment utilized in 
the actual demolition and load out of the building became 
regulated when the project was completed. The equipment 
used inside the contamination areas was considered 
contaminated upon compktion and will be employed on future 
contaminated demolition work. 
If contaminated equipment is brought in by a contractor or 
from another demolition site, understanding the type of 
contamination is paramount. Site specific requirements and/or 
waste acceptance criteria can be impacted if new radionuclide’s 
have the potential to be introduced. 
Verification Monltoring 
To verify that the demolition did not emit contamination 
beyond the control zones, four continuous air monitors (CAMS) 
and four fixed head ajr samplers were placed around the 
demolition area, at the edge of the CA. In addition to the air 
sampling devices, fixed plate survey stations were placed along 
the perimeter of the CA boundary. Part of the monitoring 
included the lapel air samples that were collected from any 
individual who entered the CA. 
The significant amount of data collected provided the 
project verification that no contamination spread outside the 
CA, confirmed dispersion modeling, and there were no 
personnel contamination events. 
Waste Load Out 
The building debris was loaded out on an ongoing basis 
into 25 cubic meter (30 yard) roll-off containers using a front 
end loader. The containers were prepared with h e r s  and 
absorbent and placed into the contamination area. To keep the 
container shuttle truck and the exterior of the containers 
radiologically clean, heavy plastic was rolled from the clean 
area into the CA to accommodate both the truck and container 
placement. The plastic road allowed a significant reduction in 
survey time prior to removing the container from the CA. 
FOI the most part, the entire building was designated as 
low-level waste (LLW) and was disposed in Hanford‘s 
Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF). At one 
building, some of the concrete walls were designated as TRU 
waste and had to be cut out and disposed of in TRU containers. 
In calculating waste-disposal volumes and weights, the 
type of budding construction material and levels of 
contamination will affect the total waste volume. Buildings 
made predominately of concrete block will create less total 
volume than highly contammated sheet metaI. Higher levels of 
contamination typically will dictate less processing or size 
reduction prior to placement in the waste containers. 
Lessons Learned 
Noteworthy lessons that can be applied to future 
demolition activities are key to improving on the existing 
process. The lessons found to be noteworthy are provided 
below. 
smearable or removable contamination before the start of 
demolition proved effective. Furthermore, the fixatives 
applied during demolition, kept contamination locked 
down during loading and periods of inactivity. 
Picking out a building among other buildings is 
dificult and more costly - Selective demolition is more 
costly and time consuming due to adjacent facility 
protection, radiological contamination spread concerns, 
protection of non-demolition personnel, and 
mobilizatiodde-mobilization. 
contamination -The misting devices on and surrounding 
the building and on the shear controlled the dust and 
contamination. The f i e  mist performed well at capturing 
airborne particles and keepmg them within the confnes of 
our radiological boundaries. One down side to the misting 
is that during breezy periods, the effectiveness i s  reduced. 
Dispersion modeling helped in setting radiological 
boundaria and provided a “level of comfort” for plant 
personnel - The dispersion modeling supported ow efforts 
to perform open-air demolition, helped in setting boundary 
locations and picking demolition methods. The results 
Fixative applications are effective - The fixing of any 
Misting devices and water are effective at controlling 
5 Copyright Q 2007 by ASME 
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were discussed during the pre-demolition informational 
meetings and provided a “level of comfort” for the plant 
personnel. The modeling tends to be conservative; 
however, the project did revise the modeling inputs based 
on actual conditions for future use in dispersion modeling. 
Selected removal of highty contaminated deb& before 
the remainder of the building was demolished greatly 
reduced the potential for the spread of contamination - By 
removing/packaging the selected, highly contaminated 
material contained in the building before demolishing the 
remainder of the building reduces the potential for the 
spread of contamination, the contamination of the 
demolition equipment, and airborne concerns [l]. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Open-air demolition of a highly plutonium-contaminated 
facility can be accomplished successfully. The decisions made 
with respect to performing open-air demolition without 
decontamination to near free release standards provided a 
successhl mix of ALARA to the workers while accomplishing 
a safe, cost effective, and efficient demolition project. 
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